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COMMENT

"YOU HAVE THE
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT...
YOU HAVE NO RIGHT TO YOUR DNA"
LOUISIANA'S DNA DETECTION OF

SEXUAL AND VIOLENT OFFENDER'S
ACT: AN IMPERMISSIBLE
INFRINGEMENT ON FOURTH

AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE
I.

INTRODUCTION:

Imagine taking a trip to New Orleans, Louisiana to celebrate Mardi
Gras. In the midst of the Friday night Bourbon Street festivities, the
celebration gets a little out of hand. You find yourself rounded up with a
group of rowdy participants. Upon arrest, the police proceed to take
your picture and your fingerprints. Then, unexpectedly, they prick your
finger and collect a sample of your blood. The police are acting pursuant
to a new Act that requires a DNA sample as part of the booking procedure. You ask, "Why did you take my blood?" The police officer explains
that the blood contains your DNA, and that the DNA will be analyzed
and placed in a computerized data bank. The officer further explains
that it will be used for identification in future crimes or for any other
uses as "they" see necessary. You reply, "But doesn't my DNA contain
information such as my medical background and potential diseases?
Isn't my DNA the only thing that makes me unique from everyone else
in the world?" The police officer laughs as he answers, "Yeah, but who
cares. The government needs it to aid in future arrests, or to identify
your remains if there is another terrorist incident, or maybe even to
give it to your employer or insurance company so that they can determine whether you are worth the risk of insurability." You protest, "But
I don't want them to have it".. .and the police officer shrugs and says,
"You have no choice..."
On June 20, 2003, the Louisiana legislature enacted the DNA Detec-
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tion of Sexual and Violent Offenders Act ("Act").1 This Act requires ar2
restees to furnish their DNA for the Louisiana State DNA data bank.
The question to address is whether this Act is constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.
This Comment will examine the history and purpose of the Act, and
then give an overview of DNA collection methods and uses of DNA. 3 The
4
focus will then shift to the relevant Fourth Amendment right to privacy
and search and seizure issues. Specifically, this Comment will review
the standards of probable cause, and how the government defends its
legitimate interests over the individual privacy interest with the balancing test and the special needs test. Also, the Katz test and the minimally
intrusive analysis are used in probing this DNA databank issue. This
Comment will analyze the constitutionality of the Louisiana Act pursuant to analogous case law concerning technology in general. Finally, this
Comment will argue that the United States Supreme Court should find
that the Act impermissibly infringes upon the Fourth Amendment 5 and
is therefore unconstitutional.
In order to predict how the Supreme Court will rule on this Act, it is
relevant to note that the federal judiciary is precluded from addressing
an issue unless faced with a case or controversy. 6 Since Louisiana is the
first state to implement a DNA Act against arrestees, 7 the courts have
not yet had occasion to rule on the constitutionality of such an Act. However, inevitably such an inquiry will be before the Supreme Court.
1. DNA Detection of Sexual and Violent Offenders, La. R.S. 15:609 (2004).
2. Id. (DNA is an abbreviation for deoxyribonucleic acid, a more comprehensive explanation of DNA is forthcoming).
3. Debra A. Herlica, DNA Data Banks: When Has a Good Thing Gone Too Far?, 52
Syracuse L. Rev. 951, 954 (2002) (explaining that DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid).
See also, Webster's II New College Dictionary 334 (Houghton Mifflin, 2001). Defining DNA
as deoxyribonucleic acid
[a] polymeric chromosomal constituent of living cell nuclei, having two long chains
of alternating phosphate and deoxyribose units twisted into a double helix and
joined by hydrogen bonds between the complementary bases adenine and thymine
or cytosine and guanine, each of which projects toward the axis of the helix from
one of the strands where it is bonded in a sequence that determines individual
hereditary characteristics.

Id.
4. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 958-971 (discussing that the protection of the Fourth
Amendment applies equally to all citizens regardless of guilt or innocence, that that the
Forth Amendment cannot be waived based on prior conviction of a crime, and further discussing that an unreasonable search for the purpose of Fourth Amendment analysis is a
government intrusion that "occurs when an expectation of privacy that society considers
reasonable is infringed").
5. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
6. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
7. For a discussion that Louisiana is the first state to have this DNA Act to apply to
arrestees and the Act came out in June of 2003, consult infra note 44.
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II.
A.

THE STATUTE:

BACKGROUND:

DNA

DETECTION OF SEXUAL AND VIOLENT
OFFENDERS ACT8

On June 20, 2003, 9 the Louisiana legislature amended and reenacted the Chapter known as the DNA Detection of Sexual and Violent
Offenders Act.1 0 The crux of the statute at issue is Section 609,11 which
provides that any person arrested for certain offenses are required, in
accordance with booking procedure, to submit to a DNA sample

extraction. 12
8. DNA Detection of Sexual and Violent Offenders, La. R.S. 15:609 (2004).
9. 2003 La. Acts 487
Amending R.S 15:603(8),(9),(10)and (11) and 609(A),(B), and (C) and Code of Criminal procedure Art. 572 and to enact R.S. 15:609(F),(G),(H)and(I), and to repeal
R.S. 15:615 and 619, relative to DNA detection of sexual and violent offender; to
provide relative to the collection of DNA samples from certain offenders; to provide
definitions; to add certain offenses to crimes requiring the collection of such samples; to provide relative to juvenile offenders; to requires DNA samples collection
of such offenders under certain conditions; to require DNA sample collection after
interstate transfer of offenders under certain conditions; to prohibit the invalidation of the prosecution of non-capital offences, to provide for exceptions to such
limitations; to require retroactivity of such exceptions, to authorize the use of force
under certain circumstances. To repeal provision with respect to the mandatory
charge to be imposed on certain persons; to repeal provisions with represent to the
DNA detection Fund; to provide for the effectiveness of certain provisions, and to
provide for related matters.
Id.
10. DNA Detection of Sexual and Violent Offenders, La. R.S. 15:601 (2004).
11. La. R.S. 15:609 (2004).
12. La. R.S. 15:609(A).
(A) A person who is arrested for a felony sex offence or other specified offense on or
after September 1, 1999, shall have a DNA sample withdrawn or taken at the
same time he is fingerprinted pursuant to the booking procedure;
(B) Any person who is convicted or enters into a plea agreement resulting in a
conviction on or after September 1, 1999, for a felony sex offense or other specified
offense committed prior to that date shall have a DNA sample drawn as follows:
(1) any person who is sentences to a term of confinement for an offense covered
by this Chapter shall have DNA sample drawn upon intake to a prison, jail or
any other detention facility or institution. If the person is already confined at
the time of sentencing, the person shall have a DNA sample drawn immediately
after the sentencing.
(2) A person who is convicted or enters into a plea agreement resulting in a
conviction for any offense covered by this Chapter shall have a DNA sample
drawn as a condition of any sentence that will not involve an intake into a
prison, jail, or any other detention facility or institution.
(3) Under no circumstances shall a person who is convicted or enters into a plea
agreement resulting in conviction for an offense covered by this Chapter be released in any manner after such disposition unless and until a DNA sample has
been withdrawn.
(C) A person who is convicted or enters a plea agreement resulting in a conviction
for a felony sex offense or other specified offense before September 1, 1999, and
who is still serving a term of confinement in connection therewith on that date
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The extracted DNA is then placed into the State's DNA data bank. 13
The test performed on the DNA sample is "only for law enforcement
identification purposes or to assist in the recovery or identification of
human remains from disasters or for other humanitarian identification
purposes, including identification of missing persons." 14 The sole purpose of the Act is to utilize the DNA samples for law enforcement purposes, 15 as a tool for identification in criminal investigation and in
16
discovering missing persons.
shall not be released in any manner prior to the expiration of his maximum term
of confinement unless and until a DNA sample has been withdrawn.
(D) All DNA samples taken pursuant to this Chapter shall be taken in accordance
with regulations promulgated by the state police.
(E) As used in this section the term released means any release, parole, furlough,
work release, and prerelease, or release in any other manner from a prison, jail,
juvenile detention facility, or any other place of confinement.
13. The State DNA data base - which is administered by the state police and provide DNA records to the FBI or storage and maintenance by CODIS. The State
DNA data base shall have the capability provided by computer software and procedures administered by the state police to store and maintain DNA records related
to: (1) forensic casework. (2) Offenders required to provide a DNA sample under
this Chapter; (3) Anonymous DNA records used for research or quality control.
La. R.S. 15:605 (2004).
14. La. R.S. 15:611(B) (2004) (providing procedures for conduct, disposition and use of
DNA analysis).
A. The state police shall prescribe procedures to be used in the collection, submission, identification, analysis, storage, and disposition of DNA samples and typing
results of DNA samples submitted pursuant to this Chapter. The DNA sample
typing results shall be stored in the state DNA data base and records of testing
shall be retained on file with the state police.
B. The state police may contract with third parties to effectuate the purposes of
this Chapter.
C. Except as otherwise provided in R.S. 15:612(C), the tests to be performed on
each DNA sample shall be used only for law enforcement identification purposes
or to assist in the recovery or identification of human remains from disasters or for
other humanitarian identification purposes, including identification of missing
persons.
D. Any other party contracting to carry out the functions of this Chapter shall be
subject to the same restrictions and requirements of this Chapter, insofar as applicable, as apply to the state police, and subject to any additional restrictions imposed by the state police.
La. R.S. 15:611.
15. La. R.S. 15:620 (2004) (explains authority of law enforcement officers, "nothing in
this Chapter shall limit or abrogate any existing authority of law enforcement officers to
take, maintain, store, and utilize DNA samples for law enforcement purposes").
16. La. R.S. 15:602 (2004) (discussing Legislative findings and objectives).
The Louisiana Legislature finds and declares that DNA data banks are important
tools in criminal investigations, in the exclusion of individuals who are the subject
of criminal investigations or prosecutions, and in deterring and detecting recidivist acts. More than forty states have enacted laws requiring persons arrested for
or convicted of certain crimes, especially sex offenses, to provide genetic samples
for DNA profiling. Moreover, it is the policy of this state to assist federal, state,
and local criminal justice and law enforcement agencies in the identification and
detection of individuals in criminal investigations and in the identification of miss-
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According to the Act, the DNA record or profile is removed from the
data bank if the "arrest does not result in a conviction or if the conviction
is reversed or the case dismissed." 17 If there is any disclosure of the
DNA18 records and/or confidentiality 19 is broken, there is a "minimum
penalty of $500 or imprisonment with or without hard labor for less than
six months."20 To cover the costs of the DNA extraction, a mandatory 2 '
fee of $250 is charged to the arrestee. "This money will be deposited in
22
the state treasury, specifically, the DNA Detection fund."

B.

DNA

OVERVIEW:

DNA technology has created a major revolution in the criminal justice system, from exonerating death row inmates to holding the government liable for the improper maintenance of evidence. 23 DNA collection
and storage leaves the person whose DNA has been extracted wary as to
if their privacy has been breached. A comprehensive understanding of
DNA is crucial to the foundation of this constitutional analysis. What is
DNA, and what does DNA reveal about the person it came from?
ing persons, to assist in the recovery or identification of human remains from disasters, and to assist with other humanitarian identification purposes. It is
therefore in the best interest of the state to establish a DNA data base and a DNA
data bank containing DNA samples submitted by individuals arrested, convicted,
or presently incarcerated for felony sex offenses and other specified offenses.
Id.
17. La. R.S. 15:614(A)(1)(2)(B)(2004) (providing for removal of records, "A person
whose DNA record or profile is included in the data base pursuant to this chapter may
request removal on the following grounds: (1) the arrest does not result in conviction or
plea agreement resulting in a conviction, (2) the conviction was reversed or the case
remanded").
18. La. R.S. 15:617 (2004) (discussing "disclosure of information is prohibited, no employee or any person contracting to carry out the functions of this chapter shall obtain
individually identifiable DNA information from the state data bank without authorization
and shall not disclose any information from the state DNA data bank to any person not
authorized to receive the information").
19. La. R.S. 15:616 (2004) (discussing confidentiality of records, "unless otherwise provided, all DNA profiles and samples submitted to the state police pursuant to this Chapter
shall be confidential").
20. La. R.S. 15:618 (2004) (discussing "criminal penalties for disclosure of DNA information, any person that violates R.S. 15:617(A)(B) or tampers with any of the DNA samples shall be fined not more that five hundred dollars or imprisoned with or without hard
labor for not more than six months, or both").
21. La. R.S. 15:615 (2004) (asserting mandatory cost of two hundred and fifty dollars,
unless defendant shows undue hardship, and this cost is in addition to other costs imposed
pursuant to law).
22. La. R.S. 15:619 (2004) (explaining the DNA Detection fund).
23. John P. Cronan, The Next Frontierof Law Enforcement: A Proposal for Complete
DNA Databanks, 28 Am. J. Crim. L. 119, 125 (2000).
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There are approximately 100 trillion cells in the human body.2 4 In
every human cell, a complex molecule called deoxyribonucleic acid
("DNA") is found. 2 5 Whether detection occurs in blood, saliva, hair, or
semen, "one can never lose the unique characteristics found in DNA
throughout one's life." 26 "The DNA molecule is comprised of two nucleotide strands coiled around each other and connected by rungs like a
twisted ladder consisting of two strands, known as a double-helix structure."2 7 DNA consists of a sequence of nucleic acids arranged in a specific order. 28 The unique variations in these sequences make DNA
29
analysis ideal for identification purposes."
There are two procedures used in forensic DNA testing.30 One is the
restricted fragment length polymorphism testing ("RFLP"). 3 1 This test
requires a large DNA sample to produce a "DNA fingerprint," known as
an audiogram. 3 2 Audiograms are used to create "lined data that resembles a bar code" to help determine identification. 33 The second test is the
polymerase chain reaction ("PCR")34 test; this requires a smaller sample
of DNA. 35 This test uses an enzyme, Taq polymerase, to copy specific
regions of DNA for identification." 36 DNA "fingerprinting" involves the
comparison of samples to determine identification. 3 7 Loci, are inspected
by an examiner, aided by a computer system, who determines the source
38
or person the samples came from.
DNA tells many stories. Metaphors like "the blueprint of life" and
"the future diary" reflect just how much can be revealed about people
24. Warren R. Webster, Jr., DNA DatabaseStatutes & Privacy in the InformationAge,
10 Health Matrix 119, 121 (2000).
25. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 954.
26. Id.
27. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 303 (4th Cir. 1992).
28. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 954.
29. Id.
30. Cronan, supra n. 23 (adding that identical twins have the same DNA information,
but other than this DNA is unique to every individual).
31. Id. RFLP analysis begins with the isolation of the DNA molecule from the known
sample, taken from the suspect, and the unknown sample taken from the crime scene. Id.
Scientists analyze these two samples and decide whether they came from the same person
by targeting particular locus of the genome. Id. This analysis can take several weeks. Id.
32. Id.
33. Herlica, supra n. 3.
34. Cronan, supra n. 23 (discussing PCR analysis, which can analyze smaller DNA
samples in twenty-four hours, and basically creates a genetic copy of the DNA sequence
and matching can be determined by the copies of the strands).
35. Id.
36. Id. (discussing Mitochondrial DNA testing).
37. Webster, supra n. 24.
38. Id.
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through their DNA. 3 9 DNA provides information about an individual's
physical traits.40 Genetic information can be read from DNA. 4 1 Genetic
information is highly sensitive due to the information it contains about
"unique and immutable attributes."4 2 Scientists can now discern
"height, eye color, sex, race, down to the shapes of their toes" from
DNA. 43 A DNA sample can contain information regarding disposition of
certain illnesses and diseases."4 "DNA can reveal potentially sensitive
information which can have negative effects for the donor if not properly
45
protected."
Moreover, DNA tells prosecutors if a defendant was at a crime scene,
or if a defendant committed rape. 4 6 Most importantly for the innocent,
DNA may indicate whether the accused was present at the scene of the
47
crime and committed murder, or that the culprit was someone else.
The impact of DNA technology on the criminal justice system has been
revolutionary. 48 DNA technology has overwhelmingly helped release
persons wrongfully convicted. 4 9 In 1999, "a total of sixty-eight wrongfully convicted individuals, including death row inmates, have been freed
39. David H. Kaye, Michael E. Smith, & Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Is DNA Identification Databasein Your Future?, 16 Crim. Just. 4, 6 (2001).
40. Webster, supra n. 24.
41. Joanne L. Hustead & Janlori Goldman, The Genetics Revolution: Conflicts, Challenges, and Conundra, 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 285 (2002) (discussing how genetic information is a subset of medical information).
42. Id.
43. Lindey A. Elkins, Five Foot Two with Eyes of Blue: Physicalprofiling and the Prospect of Genetics-based CriminalJustice System, 17 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. 'Policy
269, 282 (2003).
44. Cronan, supra n. 23, at 139. DNA can serve a very dangerous purpose if misused or
abused or disclosed due to the highly personal information contained within the DNA sample; therefore if this information were to get in the wrong hands may be difficult for an
individual to get health insurance or life insurance, or for one's children to get insurance.
Id. Genetic information can be discriminatory in effect that people the exhibit specific genetic characteristics that are more prone to disease would create higher premiums for
health insurers. Id.
45. Webster, supra n. 24, at 134.
46. Symposium, The Human Genome Project,DNA Science and the Law: the American
Legal System's Response to Breakthroughsin Genetic Science, CriminalLaw and DNA Science: Balancing Social Interests and Civil Liberties, 51 Am. U.L. Rev. 401, 414 (2002) [hereinafter Symposium Human Genome] (discussing the Innocence Project, which investigates
claims of innocence based on DNA evidence that was never taken because the technology
was not available during their trial).
47. Id. at 416 (discussing Earl Washington's case were DNA evidence determined that
he was never at the crime scene of the murders, yet he is still in jail, despite a gubernatorial pardon).
48. Webster, supra n. 24.
49. Symposium Human Genome, supra n. 44.
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as a result of DNA analysis." 50 However, the vast majority of crimes
cannot be resolved by DNA evidence because the criminals do not leave
51
behind physical cellular evidence.
Recently, DNA is currently taken from newborn babies for public
health purposes, such as testing for diseases like phenylketonurea 52 and
then later placed in state data banks. 53 Other states are trying to figure
out ways to accumulate DNA samples in their data banks and the best
way they can do so is by taking the samples from newborn babies and
convicted criminals. Louisiana's Act wants to extend this class of DNA
contributors to include arrestees. The Court has yet to speak about an
arrestee's expectations of privacy, which is what this Comment seeks to
develop.
C.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

The Fourth Amendment protects all persons against unreasonable
search and seizure of their person and their private property. 5 4 This
protection is granted to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 5 An unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment analysis
is a government intrusion that "occurs when an expectation of privacy
56
that society considers reasonable is infringed."
The language of the Fourth Amendment went through various
50. Cronan, supra n. 23, at 131. Modern DNA technology can be beneficial with respect
to victims of wrongful conviction, which relates back to Judge Learned Hand's pronouncement seventy-five years ago that, 'our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of
the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream". Id. DNA has now unearthed this all
too frequent occurrence of wrongful convictions. Id.
51. Symposium Human Genome, supra n. 44 (discussing crimes such as tax evasion,
which do not require DNA evidence).
52. W. Glanze, The Signet Mosby Medical Encyclopedia, 411 (rev. ed., New York: Penguin Books Ltd. 1996).
PKU, which stands for Phenylketonuria, is an inherited metabolic disease (also
called an inborn error of metabolism) that leads to mental retardation and other
developmental disabilities if untreated in infancy. With an inborn error of metabolism, the body is unable to produce proteins or enzymes needed to convert certain
toxic chemicals into nontoxic products, or to transport substances from one place
to another. DNA can detect if newborns are predisposed to this disease and this
the proper low-protein diet consisting of foods that have little or no phenylalanine
can counter the disease, which is why when babies are born they get a DNA sample to test for this disease. Furthermore, because they already have this sample
they put it in their State data bank.
Id.
53. Id. at 412.
54. U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and
no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be search, and the persons or things to be seized").
55. U.S. Const. amend. XlV; see also Wolfv. Colo., 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
56. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 959.
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changes as it passed through Congress. 5 7 James Madison introduced a
version that provided:
The rights to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and
their property, from all unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be
violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath
the places to be searched
or affirmation or not particularly describing
58
and the persons or things to be seized.
At common law, property was held in the highest regard and received greater protection than one's body. 5 9 Over time, however, the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment became the protection of pri61
vacy rights. 60 The Fourth Amendment protects people, not property.
In Kyllo v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal agent's
use of infrared thermal imaging to detect the lights used to grow marijuana plants was an unconstitutional search. 6 2 The Court reasoned that
inspecting materials on the surface was not a search. 6 3 However, once
the walls of someone's home have been penetrated, one may be able to
observe intimate moments. Therefore, this search was found worthy of
Fourth Amendment protection. 6 4 The dissent claimed there was a distinction between "off-the-wall" observations and "through-the-wall surveillance, and that off-the-wall surveillance did not require Fourth
amendment protections because no privacy was impeded." 6 5 The distinction between property protection and bodily protection tends to blur, and
the Court focuses on both when discussing Fourth Amendment analysis.
1.

Probable Cause

Probable cause 66 is required before an arrest may be made. 6 7 Probable cause must be demonstrated in order to obtain a search warrant and
57. Findlaw, U.S. ConstitutionFourthAmendment, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/
constitution/amendment04 (accessed Oct. 27, 2003)
58. Id. (discussing 1 Annals of Congress 434-35 (June 8, 1789)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 30 (2001).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Black's Law Dictionary 1219 (Bryan A. Garner Ed., 7th ed., West, 1999) (defining
probable cause as a reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime. Under the
Fourth Amendment, probable cause - which amounts to more than a bare suspicious but
less than evidence that would justify a conviction - must be shown before an arrest warrant or search warrant may be issued).
67. U.S. v. Robinson, 354 F.2d 109, 110 (U.S. App. 1965).
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conduct a search.68 The Courts have long established that a finding of
probable cause is the standard rule recognized by the Fourth Amendment because the "overriding function is to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwanted intrusion by the state."6 9 In Schmerber v. California, the defendant was involved in an accident and subsequently convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. 70 While at the hospital,
the police ordered a blood sample taken from the defendant to determine
his blood alcohol level. 71 The report of his blood alcohol level was admitted at trial over the defendant's objection that the test was nonconsensual. 7 2 The Supreme Court found probable cause existed to take the

blood test because the police officer noticed symptoms of drunkenness,
and the blood test was substantive to the crime. 73 "Probable cause is
something more than mere suspicion and must carefully be considered
74
when determining whether to conduct a search or seizure."
In U.S. v. Kincade, the state of California enacted the DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act of 200075 that required those in federal custody,
on parole, on probation, or on supervised release to provide a DNA sample for its state databank. 76 The Act required these individuals to submit to the nonconsensual withdrawal of blood by governmental
authorities. 7 7 No suspicion was required, nor was there any requirement
that the sample be taken to aid in an investigation of a particular
crime. 78 The defendant pled guilty to armed bank robbery, but was released on August 4, 2000. 79 Pursuant to the DNA Act, the defendant's

probation officer ordered him to submit to a blood extraction for DNA
68. U.S. v. Kincaid, 345 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003) (asserting that individualized
suspicion / probable cause should be required for searches of parolees' bodies. "Although
forced blood extractions constitute searches... as a general rule, every search must be
based upon probable cause, even without a warrant. The compulsory extraction of blood for
a law enforcement purpose is reasonable only if the search is supported by individualized
reasonable suspicion").
69. Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
70. Id. at 770.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 769. At the scene shortly after the accident, the officer smelled liquor on
defendant's breath, his eyes were "bloodshot, watery, sort of a glassy appearance". Id.
Later the officer informed defendant "that he was under arrest and that he was entitled to
the services of an attorney, and that he could remain silent, and that anything that he told
me would be used against him in evidence." Id..
74. Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (finding that probable cause is what
protects citizens from "unreasonable interferences with privacy from unfounded charges of
crime").
75. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a.
76. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1098.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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analysis.8 0 The defendant refused to comply and his probation officer
recommended that the defendant violated probation. 1
The Ninth Circuit in Kincade held that probable cause is required
for a forced extraction of blood. 8 2 As a general rule under the Fourth
Amendment, a search, even if conducted lawfully without a search war83
rant, must be based on probable cause.
2.

Balancing Test

To determine what constitutes a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, courts impose a balancing test 8 4 between the government's
interests in the search to the level of intrusion on the individual's privacy.8 5 In Schmerber,8 6 the defendant argued that withdrawing his
blood was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.8 7 The
U.S. Supreme Court stated in Schmerber that "the interest in human
dignity and privacy is protected by the Fourth Amendment, including
the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained." 88 The Court
further stated that "the integrity of an individual's person is a cherished
89
value of our society."
There must be a compelling government need for the search to override the individual's privacy interest. 90 The Court found in Schmerber
that the police officer believed there was limited time to obtain a warrant
for the blood. The officer believed that if he did not get the sample at the
hospital, the alcohol would dissipate from the blood, and the evidence
would be destroyed. 9 1 The Court's ruling in this case was very narrow;
the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1101.
83. Id. at 1098 (citing N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
84. Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842, 844 (W.D. Va. 1991) (holding that Fourth Circuit upheld statutory requirement that all convicted felons have a DNA test taken because
they now enjoy diminished privacy rights that do not exceed the government's interest in
preserving an identification record).
85. Herlica, supra n. 3.
86. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
87. Id.
88. Id. (discussing issue of blood taken from the defendant to determine his alcohol
content was not a violation because time was of the essence in obtaining the blood sample,
and probable cause was present in this situation to justify this police action).
89. Id. at 772.
90. Id. at 759.
91. Id. at 770. The percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after
drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Id. In this case time
was of the essence, the accused had to be taken to a hospital and in order to investigate
what happened at the scene of the accident, the blood test was essential. Id. No time was
available to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Id.
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2

9
search entailed a minor intrusion.
93
In Winston v.Lee, the State of Virginia compelled a crime suspect
to undergo surgery to remove a bullet which would prove that his involvement in a robbery. 94 Whether the surgery should be granted was
determined at an evidentiary hearing. 95 The trial judge granted the motion to compel the surgery and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether such a surgery or "search" was constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment. 9 6 The Supreme Court found that to
"compel surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the
intrusion may be "unreasonable" even if likely to produce evidence of a
crime." 97 The Court explained that in order to balance the two competing interests, the test is to weigh the individual's privacy interests
against society's interests in conducting the procedure. 98 On the one

92. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 ( holding that because the blood test was taken while
he was in a hospital and by this point in time taking a blood sample was considered routine, the search was reasonable and minimally intrusive).
93. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 757 (1985).
94. Id. at 755. Watkinson was closing up his shop for the night, when he observed
someone armed with a gun coming toward him from across the street. Id. Watkinson was
also armed and when he drew his gun, the other person told him to freeze. Id. Watkinson
then fired at the other person, who returned his fire. Id. Watkinson was hit in the legs,
while the other individual, was wounded in his left side, and ran from the scene. Id. Watkinson was taken by to the emergency room. Id. And approximately twenty minutes later,
police officers found Lee suffering from a wound to his left chest area. Id. He was taken to
the same hospital Watkins was taken to. Id. And at the hospital Watkinson identified Lee
as the "man that shot me." Id. After an investigation, the police decided that respondent's
story of having been himself the victim of a robbery was untrue and charged respondent
with attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of using a firearm in the
commission of a felony. Id. The government moved in state court for an order directing Lee
to undergo surgery to remove an object thought to be a bullet lodged under his left collarbone. Id.
95. Id. The court conducted several evidentiary hearings on the motion, calling experts to testify on the length of the surgical procedure (which would take 45 minutes) and
what the chances of damages and death would be (three to four percent chance of temporary nerve damage, a one percent chance of permanent nerve damage, and a one-tenth of
one percent chance of death). Id. Other experts testified that the bullet was not "back
inside close to the nerves and arteries," instead the bullet located "just beneath the skin."
Id. at 756. He testified that the surgery would require an incision of only one and one-half
centimeters (slightly more than one-half inch), could be performed under local anesthesia,
and would result in "no danger on the basis that there's no general anesthesia employed."
Id.
96. Id. at 757.
97. Id. at 759.
98. Id. The court found that the reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin
depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the procedure. Id. In a given
case, the question whether the community's need for evidence outweighs the substantial
privacy interests at stake is a delicate one. Id.
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hand, the government claimed it needed the bullet to demonstrate that
the defendant was the robber who confronted the victim. 9 9 On the other
hand, the defendant's privacy interest was at stake because he was going
to be subjected to medical risks by undergoing surgery. 10 0 This balance
was found unreasonable and the Court held that the "Fourth Amendment is a vital safeguard of the right of the citizen to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions into any area in which he has a
reasonable expectation of privacy." 1 1
3.

Special Needs Test

0 2
The Supreme Court carved out an exception to the balancing test.1
The exception usually involves searches conducted for the purposes going beyond the ordinary needs of law enforcement. 10 3 This exception applies to a set of cases known as the "special needs" cases.' 0 4 These cases
deemed constitutional those searches that would otherwise require probable cause. This type of search is permissible because it serves "special
10 5
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement."
In special need cases, the Supreme Court has found that something
that goes beyond a law enforcement purpose would include: taking random urine tests of students participating in extracurricular activities in
order to deter drug use and prevent injury; 10 6 taking random blood and

99. Id. at 765.
100. Winston, 470 U.S. at 765.
101. Id. at 767.
102. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1101.
103. Id. at 1105 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002) (holding that
urine testing of students for extracurricular activities to prevent health and safety risks
from drug use was a special need); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,(1995)
(holding that random urine testing of student athletes to prevent injury and drug dependency was a special need); Skinner v. Ry.Labor Execs.' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding
that blood and urine tests of railroad employees to prevent railway accidents was a special
need); Natl. Treas. Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, (1989) (holding urine tests
of U.S. Customs Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to insure the officials'
fitness to interdict drugs and handle firearms was a special need); U.S.v. Gonzalez, 300
F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding searches of employee backpacks to prevent inventory
loss was a special need). The Court also has permitted suspicionless searches in certain
roadway checkpoint programs, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
(1990) (holding that highway sobriety checkpoints for public safety was a special need), and
has authorized routine searches absent individualized suspicion at the national border;
U.S.v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, (1985) (holding that routine border searches to
prevent entry of contraband was a special need); U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
(1976) (holding that fixed checkpoint routine border search to deter illegal immigration was
a special need).
104. Id.
105. City of Indianapolisv. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (emphasis added).
106. Bd. of Educ. v.Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002). See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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urine tests of railroad employees to prevent railroad accidents;' 0 7 and
taking urine tests of U.S. customs service employees seeking transfer or
promotion to ensure fitness to interdict drugs and handle firearms.1 0 8 In
addition, searching employees' backpacks to prevent inventory loss has
been held as a special need; 10 9 suspicionless searches are permitted at
certain roadway checkpoints in order to check highway sobriety for public safety; 1 10 routine border searches pass the special needs test because
the purpose is to prevent the smuggling of contraband; 1 1 ' and to deter
illegal immigration. 112 The Court has also approved suspicionless
searches for the administrative regulation of business, 113 including in1 14
specting residential building codes to prevent hazardous conditions.
In Kincade, the purpose of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination
Act of 2000115 was expressly for law enforcement. 11 6 The DNA use was
specifically for identification of suspects. 117 Also, the California Act's
purpose was to "help law enforcement officials solve unresolved and future cases," and to "increase accuracy in the criminal justice system." 118
The searches would collect DNA samples for Combined DNA Identification System (CODIS), so those samples may be used in future criminal
investigations to help solve crimes, prosecute culprits, and to enable law
enforcement agencies to be more accurate and effective in achieving their
law enforcement objectives. 119 The Court in Kincade found the California Act to include a valid law enforcement purpose and thus, did not
1 20
qualify as a special need exception.
4.

12 1
Katz Test

In Katz v. U.S.,122 the Court announced a twofold requirement to
determine whether a search is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.123 First, the individual being searched must have an actual sub107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs. Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
Natl. Treas. Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
U.S. v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2002).
Mich. Dept. of St. Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
N.Y. v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
Camarav. Municiple Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
DNA Analysis Backlog EliminationAct of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a.
Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1111.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1112.
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
Id.
Id.
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jective expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 124 In Katz, the defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute. 12 5 The evidence used to convict
him was obtained by an electronic listening and recording device the FBI
attached to the outside of the public telephone booth from which the defendant had placed his calls. 12 6 The Supreme Court found that the
eavesdropping constituted a search.127 The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protected the defendant from the warrantless eavesdropping because he "justifiably relied" upon the privacy of the telephone
booth. 1 28 However, the Court added to this standard by instructing that
a reasonable person must also have expected privacy. Katz did not meet
this test, because reasonable people would not have an expectation of
privacy in a phone booth.
In Kyllo v. U.S., the Court found the use of a thermal imaging device
by the FBI to scan his home was a search. 129 The device was used to
determine if the amount of heat emanating from the house was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for growing marijuana
indoors. The Court applied the Katz test and found there was an expec124. Id. A man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the plain view of outsiders are not protected because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. Id. On the other
hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard for the
expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable. Id.
125. Id. at 348.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 353. A person who occupies a phone booth and then shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. Id. To read the
Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to
play in private communication. Id.
129. Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 30 (2001). The government used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan the defendant's home. Id. The Thermal imagers detected
infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye.
Id. The imager converts radiation into images based on relative warmth black is cool,
white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences; it operates somewhat like a video
camera showing heat images. Id. The scan of Kyllo's home took only a few minutes and
was performed from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott's vehicle across the street from the
front of the house and also from the street in back of the house. Id. The scan showed that
the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner's home were relatively hot compared
to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes. Id. The agent
concluded that the defendant was using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house. Id.
Based on tips from informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a Federal Magistrate
Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of petitioner's home, and the agents found an
indoor growing operation involving more than 100 plants. Id. Petitioner was indicted on
one count of manufacturing marijuana. Id.

774

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXII

tation of privacy in one's home.' 30 The Court declared the search unconstitutional.1 31 The Court found that, because the thermal imaging
detector was not something available for general public use, there is an
assurance of the preservation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.' 32 If certain technology is not available to the public, then the
intrusion of the government using the same technology is seemingly
greater. i 33 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment helps to guard against
34
use of such intrusive devices.'
5.

Minimally Intrusive Factor

The Court announced in Schmerberi 3 5 that extraction of blood samples was reasonable because the search was minimally intrusive and because the procedure involved "virtually no risk of trauma or pain."1 3 6 In
addition, a blood test is recognized as a de minimis 37 search with little
invasion on the individual's privacy interest even though it requires penetration under the skin.' 38 In Rochin v. California,'39 the Court announced a "shock the conscience"' 40 unconstitutional standard of
intrusion. The police went into the defendant's home with "some suspicion" that the defendant may have been selling narcotics.' 4 ' The police
took the defendant to the hospital to have his stomach pumped in order
130. Id. at 34.
131. Id. Withdrawing protection from one's home would be to permit police technology
to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Id. Obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area," (see Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512), and thus constitutes a search. Id.
132. Id. at 35. Because the technology in question is not in general public use, it could
not have been obtained without an intrusion that is constitutionally protected. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted. Id. On the basis of this criterion, the information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
136. Id. at 771 (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352, U.S. 432, 436 (1957).
The blood test procedure has become routine in our everyday life. It is a ritual for
those going into the military service as well as those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges require such test before permitting entrance and literally
millions have voluntary gone through the same process as blood donors.
Id.
137. Black's Law Dictionary 1219 (Bryan A. Garner Ed., 7th ed., West, 1999) (defining
de minimis 1. Trifling, minimal. 2. of a fact or thing so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case).
138. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
139. Rochin v. Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952).
140. Id. (Justice Frankfurter's famous and widely used quote: "shock the conscience").
141. Id.
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to get two capsules they saw him swallow.1 4 2 The Court found that
pumping the defendant's stomach was so intrusive that it "shocked the
conscience," "offended a sense of justice," and ran "counter to the decencies of civilized conduct." Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that
without a search warrant, this type of search was unconstitutional. 14 3
Moreover, the basic understanding of whether a search is minimally
intrusive is based on the individual's expectation of privacy.'4 Also, the
expectation of privacy may be based upon the status of the person to be
searched. 145 The Ninth Circuit held that convicted criminals lose their
expectation of privacy in their DNA information based on their status;
they are not free persons. 14 6 The Fourth Circuit held that there is an
assumption that prisoners forfeit certain rights because of their criminal
acts, and, as a consequence, retain a diminished expectation of privacy. 147 The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a convicted person
has diminished privacy rights and that the minimal intrusion of a blood
test does not outweigh the governmental interests of obtaining DNA for
future criminal investigations. 1 4 8 In In re Nicholson,'1 49 the Ohio court
142. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
143. Id. at 175 (discussing how the actions taken by the California Supreme Court sanctioned a force so brutal and offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from Rochin).
144. Id.
145. Cronan, supra n. 23, at 147-148. The court ruled that allowing "expanded collection
from persons convicted of certain crimes would lead to a greater privacy intrusion." Id.
Prior cases have found convicted felons enjoy diminished privacy interest and government's
interest supercedes their rights. Id. The status indications shows that courts can constitute for a certain hierarchy of privacy protection can be indicated as a person that is an
arrestee, a convicted person, a parolee, or a person on probation. Id. at 149.
146. Rise v. Or., 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (1995). The court reasoned that blood samples were
being acquired from convicts and:
not from free persons or even mere arrestees, but only from certain classes of convicted felons in order to create a record for possible use for identification in the
future. These persons do not have the same expectations of privacy in their identifying genetic information that "free persons" have. Once a person is convicted of
one of the felonies included as predicate offenses under Chapter 669, his identity
has become a matter of state interest and he has lost any legitimate expectation of
privacy in the identifying information derived from the blood sampling.
Id.
147. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. upheld Virginia's DNA databank statute
because convicted criminals lose a certain amount of privacy interest).
148. Landry v. AG, 429 Mass. 336, 347 (Mass. 1999) (discussing the Massachusetts
database statute, St. 1997, c. 106, codified for the most part at G. L. C. 22E, § § 1-15) and
holding:
[Wihile obtaining and analyzing the DNA [under the Act] is a search and seizure
implicating Fourth Amendment concerns, it is a reasonable search and seizure
because a convicted person's has diminished privacy rights... the minimal intrusion of... blood tests; and the legitimate government interest in the investigation
and prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in a manner not significantly different from the use of fingerprints.
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of appeals held that a juvenile can have a DNA sample taken because
his/her privacy rights were outweighed by the "state's legitimate interest in creating a DNA identification data bank to deter a juvenile 150 from
committing future sex offenses, and to aid the police in the investigation
of past and future crimes." 15 1 These examples were considered legitimate state interests that outweighed the minimally intrusive drawing of
blood. 1 52 Furthermore, the Ohio court of appeals found that taking a
DNA sample under the statute 153 was analogous to taking a fingerprint.15 4 In Mayfield v. Dalton, the district court found that the military
taking DNA samples from its marines for the Department of Defense
DNA Registry in order to identify remains were not in violation of the
Fourth Amendment because of the compelling government interest
involved. 155
149. In re Nicholson, 132 Ohio App. 3d 303, 308-309 (1999) (case concerns a DNA statute R.C. 2151.315(B)(2) that takes a sample when an individual is leaving custody pursuant to if the individual refused to provide a sample during the intake procedure pursuant to
R.C. 2151.315(B)(1), defendant claim this violated right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures provided by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
150. Id. (discussing what a juvenile is, and explaining that before a DNA sample can be
collected under R.C. 2151.315, a child must first be adjudicated a delinquent child for committing acts listed in division "D" of that section. Therefore, the determination of whether
to draw blood for a DNA sample is either based upon an adjudication of delinquency which
is based upon the reasonable doubt standard or a constitutionally safeguarded admission
by the juvenile that the act was committed).
151. Id.
152. Id. The court held Statute R.C. 2151.315 to be sufficiently narrow in scope to apply
only to those individuals adjudicated a delinquent child for committing specific acts. Id.
Thus, taking the sample minimally intrusive to analyze the DNA of a juvenile in custody,
who admitted to committing gross sexual imposition, as a reasonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment when considering the nature of the intrusion and legitimate
governmental interest of keeping a DNA data bank. Id.
153. Id.
154. In re Nicholson, 132 Ohio App. at 308-309.
155. Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 305 (U.S. Dist. 1995). Plaintiffs Marines refused to give their DNA samples and were later charged with violating an order from a
superior officer. Id. The Marines claimed that taking DNA samples without their consent
violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The military asserted that the DNA would
not be used except to identify the Marines' remains if necessary. Id. They argue that even
though the current purpose of the DNA was for identification, the military could, at some
point in the future, use the DNA samples for some less innocuous purpose, such as the
diagnosis of hereditary diseases or disorders and the use or dissemination of such diagnoses to potential employers, insurers and others with a possible interest in such information.
Id. The court held that the military demonstrated a compelling interest in both its need to
account internally for the fate of its service members and in ensuring the peace of mind of
their next of kin and dependents in time of war. Id. And also that when measured against
this interest, the minimal intrusion presented by the taking of blood samples and oral
swabs for the military's DNA registry, though undoubtedly a "seizure," is not an unreasonable seizure and is thus not prohibited by the Constitution. Id.
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Even certain classes of people with diminished expectations possess
privacy rights that cannot be violated. In Hudson v. Palmer, the U.S.
Supreme Court explained that "even a prisoner, who has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in his cell, retains an expectation of privacy in his
body unless there is probable cause to violate his body and a legitimate
penological interest in doing so." 1 5 6 The Ninth Circuit found that a parolee under house arrest has a greater privacy interest that of an inmate.1 57 The Supreme Court has yet to speak on an arrestee's
expectations of privacy, which again, is what this Comment seeks to find.

D.

APPLYING FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE STANDARDS

TO DNA:
In examining the DNA controversy, certain courts have maintained
that the probable cause standard, the balancing test, the special needs
test, the Katz test, and the minimally intrusive tests are readily applicable to DNA databank cases. 158 According to various case law, the collection of DNA constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 15 9
Several federal courts have found it constitutional for DNA databank
acts to require convicted criminals to give a sample of their DNA. 160
However, in U.S. v. Kincade,16 1 (a case of first impression), the Ninth
Circuit determined that the federal DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination
Act of 2000162 requiring those in federal custody, on parole, on probation,
or on supervised release to provide a DNA sample, violated the Fourth
156. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). See Tribble v. Gardner,860 F.2d 321,
325 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that digital rectal searches of prisoners must be justified by
legitimate penological need).
157. See Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
constitutional rights of parolees "are even more extensive than those of inmates").
158. Webster, supra n. 24, at 123-127.
159. Cronan, supra n. 23, at 143 (discussing Schmerber v. California, where the Supreme Court discusses that taking blood 'plainly constitutes a search of persons" and thus
it depends antecedently upon seizures of persons within the Fourth Amendment").
160. Id. at 143 ((discussing Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842, 844 (W.D. Va. 1991), the
Fourth Circuit upheld statutory requirement that all convicted felons have a DNA test
taken because they now enjoy diminished privacy rights that do not exceed the government's interest in preserving an identification record); (discussing State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d
1076 (Wash, 1993), court held that the extraction of blood and its subsequent testing qualified as an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement); (discussing People v.
Wealer, 636 N.E. 2D 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), court upheld the State's DNA collection Act
because the government interest exceeded the privacy interest that a convicted sex offender has in his or her identity")).
161. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1095.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2) ("The DNA Act simply states that "the probation office
responsible for the supervision under Federal law of an individual on probation, parole, or
supervised release shall collect a DNA sample from each such individual who is, or has
been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense").
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Amendment because there was no special need and the taking of DNA
was intrusive. 1 6 3 Prior to this Louisiana Act, most jurisdictions utilized
post-conviction DNA database acts, therefore making the timing of DNA
sample extraction important in constitutional analysis. 16 4 If DNA is
taken post conviction, there are minimal privacy rights. 16 5 But, if DNA
is taken before an indictment, preliminary hearing, or trial, it is unconstitutional because of the presumption of innocence until proven
guilty. 16 6 Regardless, in the Louisiana's rush to create databanks, there
has been little attention on the issue of "quality control, quality assur1 67
ance and most importantly privacy."
Again, courts have not yet spoken on the constitutionality of applying the Louisiana DNA Databank Act to mere arrestees. 168 When taking
into consideration both the historical background behind the Fourth
Amendment and the continuous advancement of modern technology,
there is an obvious need to apply the 200 year-old Fourth Amendment to
current issues. Without a contemporary interpretation of the Constitution, "what limits are there upon this power of technology to shrink the
169
realm of guaranteed privacy?"
III. ANALYSIS:
Technological advances frequently raise new constitutional concerns
and threaten basic liberties. "It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology." 170 Here, the challenge
involves a compulsory DNA collection act that poses a threat to one of
the most fundamental and traditional preserves of individual privacy,
the human body. 171 Needless to say, plenty of controversy surrounds the
purpose of the Louisiana DNA Act and the rationale behind taking DNA
17 2
solely for identification.
An imbalance exists between the substantial need for the DNA sample for identification and the rights of the individual to protect their genetic information. The true issue here is the fact that, in America, those
arrested are presumed innocent. Yet, even with this presumption, certain rights are minimized and seemingly diminished. This Act does not
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1095.
Webster, supra n. 24 at 128.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 130.
Symposium Human Genome, supra n. 44, at 414.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
Id.
Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1095.
La. R.S. 15:602, 15:620 (2004).
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pass constitutional muster on several grounds. The most important reason is the capitulation of natural human rights; or simply put, the right
to restrain the government from accessing the blueprint of an individual
without probable cause or permission.
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decide a case concerning DNA
databank acts, specifically one concerning taking DNA from arrestees. 17 3 However, the Supreme Court has recently ruled on a case
pertinent to the issue of technology in the realm of criminal justice in
Kyllo v. U.S.1 4 Kyllo, along with the recent Ninth Circuit case U.S. v.
Kincade,1 75 will be utilized to envisage how the U.S. Supreme Court
would analyze this issue of the Louisiana Databank Act as applied to
arrestees.
A.

THE DNA "SEARCH"

In order to analyze a Fourth Amendment search and seizure issue,
we have to determine whether taking a person's DNA constitutes a
search.' 76 The Supreme Court has held that blood extractions used for
testing procedures is a search and is restricted by the Fourth Amendment. 177 Likewise, under the Act, DNA is defined as a "blood, tissue, or
bodily fluid sample taken from person," l 78 and would constitute a
search. Other sources of DNA may include saliva, skin cells, bone, teeth,
tissue, urine, and feces. 17 9 In Schmerber, the Court found that taking
blood to determine whether the defendant was driving while intoxicated
was a search.' 8 0 Therefore, in extracting any of these materials for a
DNA test, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly hold that such removal
involves a constitutional search of one's person and property.' 8 ' One has
a "possessory interest in [his or her] own bodily fluids."18 2 Therefore, in
order to obtain DNA, the government must have a search warrant based
173. Symposium Human Genome, supra n. 44, at 411 (explaining how Louisiana has a
law that permits DNA to be taken at the point of arrest, although that has yet to be implemented largely, I believe, for cost reasons. "The validity of these laws have yet to be tested
in the courts").
174. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
175. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1095.
176. Cronan, supra n. 23 at 143.
177. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
178. DNA Detection of Sexual and Violent Offenders, Drawingand Taking of DNA Samples, La. R.S. 15:603 (2004) (defining "DNA sample").
179. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1095 (citing Victor Walter Weed and John W. Hicks, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, The UnrealizedPotential of DNA Testing 2 (1998)).
180. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
181. Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.'Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
182. Id.
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18 3
on probable cause pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
In applying recent technological advances into the realm of a search,
the U.S. Supreme Court found in Kyllo that use of an infrared thermal
imaging detector to search for infrared halide light used to grow marijuana plants was an unconstitutional search.18 4 A person's home being
invaded by a thermo imaging detection device is analogous to a person's
DNA being compulsively mandated by this Act. First, arguably no
search exists when you inspect materials on the surface of the body or off
of the surface of a house.' 8 5 DNA is not an inspection above the surface.
DNA is collected from the deepest depths of the human body, well below
the surface on a cellular, microscopic level.' 8 6 DNA is taken from the
skin, blood, and is extracted from the body.' 8 7 This is not a mere brushing off of paint to test its color; this is a porous incision into one's identity. The information requested from the DNA is broken down from
within the sample to a microscopic level that requires complicated
tests.18 8 This testing procedure is not something that any member of the
public can do, which is critical in the Kyllo analysis. The technology of
analyzing DNA is not readily available for public use. In Kyllo, a thermal
imaging device was something only the government has access to, while
similarly with this Act, DNA identification technology is only available
to the state, not the public. There is a reasonable expectation that DNA
is private since the technology is not readily available to the public;
therefore, this search is constitutionally protected under the Fourth
Amendment and probable cause is required.
Second, DNA information is similar to the Court's analogy in Kyllo
to revealing the intimate details, the "hour each night the lady of the
house takes her daily sauna and bath."is9 DNA reveals intimate details
of genetic information, such as the propensity for certain diseases and
thus, such a search is intrusive. Third, a DNA search is not "off the
wall," DNA analysis perforates the surface of a wall to find a rat. 190 As
in Kyllo, the search through the walls was to find a crime and a crimi-

183. Furgusen v.City of Charleston,532 U.S. 67, 83-86 (2001) (holding that a non-consensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid search warrant).
184. Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 30 (2001).
185. Id. (dissent asserting that a fundamental difference exists between what it calls
'off-the-wall" observations and "through-the-wall surveillance, and that anything learned
through "an inference" cannot be a search).
186. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 955.
187. Id.
188. Webster, supra n. 24, at 121 (discussing the intricacies of the determining an identification match pursuant to a DNA sample analysis).
189. Ky~lo, 533 U.S. 27.
190. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 973 (analogizing how DNA databanks are not means of
preventing crime, but are used for deterring future crime).
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nal. 19 1 Similarly, the Act will later be used to identify criminals and
potential crimes. 192 The purpose of the DNA is to make law enforcement
investigation easier, while at the same time providing the possibility of
the ultimate intrusion into one's genetic privacy. 1 93 Such intrusion is
exactly what the balancing test and the special needs test seek to
194
prohibit.

B.
1.

THE UNREASONABLENESS OF THE DNA SEARCH:

The Balancing Test:

The balancing test requires two basic elements: a governmental
need and a privacy interest. 19 5 With this DNA Act, a privacy concern
exists, but not a substantial governmental need. Therefore, the balancing scales should be tipped on the side with the most weight, in this case,
the privacy of a person's DNA. A person's DNA, their biological blue
print, whether used for inculpatory evidence or for identification, is private information.
What is the compelling government need behind this Act? In Kincade,19 6 "the government's expressed interest in the search was to prevent, solve, and prosecute future crimes, and to complete the CODIS
database. " 197 The court said that the identification need was not enough
without probable cause or a search warrant. 198 In Winston v. Lee, 19 9 the
government expressed that its need was to get the bullet to obtain as
evidence that the defendant was the robber. 20 0 The court said that this
20 1
was not enough of a need, even with probable cause.
191. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27.
192. La. R.S. 15:602 (2004).
193. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 963 (arguing that privacy is violated by the DNA testing due
to potential uses of information and characteristics revealed by DNA). See also Jones, 763
F. Supp. at 847.
194. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 962 (discussing how the balancing test refers to the balancing of the governmental need for the action against the individuals privacy and how the
special needs tests proves that the governmental interest superceded the individuals privacy concern because it goes further to go beyond law enforcement).
195. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
196. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1103.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Winston, 470 U.S. at 757.
200. Id. at 766.
201. Id. at 764. The court found that the State plainly had probable cause to conduct the
search. Id. All parties apparently agreed that respondent had a full measure of procedural
protections and had been able fully to litigate the difficult medical and legal questions necessarily involved in analyzing the reasonableness of a surgical incision of this magnitude.
Id. The court found that the Fourth Amendment's command for searches to be "reasonable"
requires that when the State seeks to intrude upon an area in which our society recognizes
a significantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial justification is required to

782

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXII

Here, the governmental need behind searches under the Louisiana
DNA Act is "only for law enforcement identification purposes, to assist in
the recovery or identification of human remains from disasters, and for
other humanitarian identification purposes, including identification of
missing persons." 20 2 Is this need for identification more forceful than
the need to keep sensitive genetic information on file with the government; especially if this information has potential to show whether a person is predisposed to diseases? 20 3 The information obtained from DNA is
not going to be used as evidence in the arrestees' case, unlike in Winston,20 4 where the bullet was needed to prove an element of the offense.
Furthermore, in Winston, probable cause was found in order to extract
the bullet; yet the Court said this need for evidence was not enough to
overturn his right not to be subject to medical risks. 20 5 Therefore, the
search was unconstitutional. 20 6 Likewise, through this Act, the governmental need for identification of a person does not outweigh the privacy
right of arrestees to keep their genetic information to themselves, and be
free from undergoing risk of their DNA information being disclosed.
Courts have found that taking fingerprints for identification without
probable cause or a search warrant is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 20 7 DNA, like fingerprints, identifies an individual. DNA identifi20 8
cation results from a forced intrusion within an individual's body
whereas a fingerprint is an on the surface mechanism for identification. 20 9 However, a qualitative difference exists between taking fingermake the search "reasonable." Id. Applying these principles, the court held that the proposed search in the case would be "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
202. La. R.S. 15:602 (2004).
203. Kaye, supra n. 38, at 943.
204. Winston, 470 U.S. at 757 (1985).
205. Id. at 764.
206. Id.
207. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1103. (citing Davis v.Miss., 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (holding
detention for sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints without probable cause or warrant violates FourthAmendment)). In Kincade, the court found that law enforcement did not question Kincade's true identity; it merely sought to obtain evidence for future criminal
investigations. Id.
208. Id. at 1100.
209. Id. The court analogized the difference between invasive procedures of the body
that necessitate penetrating the skin, and an examination or recording of physical attributes that are generally exposed to public view. Id. An individual cannot hold the same
expectation of privacy for this latter category of information that he does for his internal
properties, including blood. U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-6, (1973) (discussing that "fingerprinting is not entirely free from Fourth Amendment concerns). Fingerprints taken
pursuant to an arrest are part of so-called "booking" procedures, designed to ensure that
the person who is arrested is in fact the person law enforcement officials believe they have
in custody. See Smith v. U.S., 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("It is elementary that a
person in lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing and fingerprinting as
part of routine identification processes"). In Napolitano v. U.S., 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.

20041

LOUISIANA DNA ACT

prints or a mug shot for identification when compared to taking DNA.
The difference in the taking of DNA is that a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists when one's genetic information is involved. DNA information is a privacy interest that a government need for identification cannot trump. In Kincade, the court held that the taking of DNA to meet
the government's need for a comprehensive databank did not outweigh
the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in his body without a
warrant. 2 10 Accordingly, taking DNA under this Act without probable
cause or without a warrant is likewise a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Courts have previously found that there must be probable cause to
take bodily fluids, specifically for DNA samples. 2 11 Probable cause has
been a foundation in the Fourth Amendment principle of reasonable
searches. 2 12 The government's desire to create a DNA databank for
identification is arguably not a great enough need when the potential for
disclosure of private genetic information is at risk. 2 13 Even if the need
was great enough, the government will have to receive consent from the
individual or produce a search warrant in order to get the DNA sample.2 14 Therefore, without such permission by the person or by the court,
the constitutionality of obtaining a DNA sample pursuant to booking
procedure is suspect. However, Louisiana may attempt to defend the Act
by using the special needs doctrine" 2 15 as an exception to the balancing
test.
2.

Special Needs Doctrine

The special needs doctrine seeks to create an exception to the balancing test requirement for probable cause or even reasonable suspicion
where the search is independent of a law enforcement purpose. 216 How1965), the court stated that taking of fingerprints upon admission to bail is "universally
standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights." This administrative procedure affirms that law enforcement has the right person in its custody. When law enforcement officials detain individuals for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints in furtherance of
a criminal investigation, however, that detention violates the Fourth Amendment unless
supported by probable cause or a warrant. Id.
210. Id. at 1104.
211. Id. (asserting that individualized suspicion should be required for searches of parolees' bodies. "Although forced blood extractions constitute searches... as a general rule,
every search must be based upon probable cause, even without a warrant. The compulsory
extraction of blood for a law enforcement purpose is reasonable only if the search is supported by individualized reasonable suspicion").
212. Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
213. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1104.
214. Id. at 1103.
215. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
216. Id.
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ever, in light of the distinct purpose of the Louisiana DNA Act at issue,
the only function of the Act is a specific law enforcement purpose. 2 17 The
strict construction of Section 611 of the Act disclaims that the purpose of
this act is "only for law enforcement identification purposes... ,218 Louisiana even goes so far as to concede that the DNA is irrelevant to the
arrested act, so much so that the Act allows arrestees who are not con2 19
victed to have their DNA removed from the bank.
In applying Kincade, the court found that the California Act's 2 20 immediate purpose and the enforcement and legislative history showed a
clear law enforcement purpose. 2 21 The searches are conducted in order
to collect DNA evidence samples for CODIS, so that those samples may
be used in criminal investigations, to help solve crimes and prosecute the
culprits, and to enable law enforcement agencies to be more accurate and
effective in achieving their law enforcement objectives. 2 22 In Kincade,
the Ninth Circuit found that the DNA search of parolees violated the
Fourth Amendment because it constituted a suspicionless search with
the objective of furthering law enforcement purposes. 22 3 At a minimum,
such searches require probable cause. 22 4 Undoubtedly, a clear parallel
exists between the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 in
Kincade, and the Louisiana Act at issue. Accordingly, when a court reviews the Louisiana Act, it will also find the compulsory DNA search to
be one that requires probable cause due to its strong similarity in purposes between this Act and the California Act in Kincade.
Furthermore, no special need is present because DNA is taken when
arrested and then given back if not convicted. 2 25 This is a convenience
for the State to hold the DNA in escrow at arrest so that it can be put in
the bank later upon conviction. The State admits that is has no justification for taking the DNA now, which is unreasonable and not a special
need.

217. La. R.S. 15:611(C) (2004).
218. La. R.S. 15:611(C) (2004).
219. La. R.S. 15:614(A)(1)(2)(B)(2004) (providing for removal of records: "A person
whose DNA record or profile is included in the data base pursuant to this chapter may
request removal on the following grounds: (1) the arrest does not result in conviction or
plea agreement resulting in a conviction. (2) the conviction was reversed or the case
remanded").
220. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a.
221. U.S. v. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1111.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1113.
224. Id.
225. La. R.S. 15:614(A)(1)(2)(B)(2004).
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The Intrusion:

The intrusion of the Act occurs in several forms. First, an intrusion
exists in taking the DNA by incision of a needle or swabbing a cotton ball
in the arrestee's mouth. Second, an intrusion exists by taking the DNA
for purposes other than evidentiary reasons. Third, an intrusion exists
by delving into the potentially sensitive genetic information and the possibility of this DNA information being disclosed. Lastly, an intrusion exists if the government establishes that an arrestee, by virtue of being
arrested, loses all rights to his or her body or genetic information.
a.

The Intrusive Swab or Incision

If a search horrifically interferes with a person's privacy interest so as
2 26
to "shock the conscience," then an unconstitutional search took place.
22 7
In analogizing this long-standing stomach pumping case (Rochin)
to
this Act, the DNA extraction from arrestees is arguably just as intrusive
and "shocking to the conscience" 2 28 as the pumping of a person's stomach
without a warrant. One can argue that the imposition of a cotton swab
inside one's mouth for the purpose of extracting cells from an arrestee's
cheek is outweighed by the government need for identification. 2 29 However, the Supreme Court held in Schmerber 230 that taking of blood for a
blood test was minimally intrusive even though it required the taking of
blood under the skin with a needle. 2 3 1 "The Supreme Court has noted
repeatedly that the drawing of blood constitutes only a minimally intrusive search." 2 32 Therefore, a court is likely to find that under this Act,
taking a sample of DNA from a cotton swab in an arrestee's mouth or
from a needle is unlikely to be an intrusive action.
b.

The Non-Evidentiary Use

Additionally, in Schmerber, taking a blood test in order to ascertain
whether the suspect's blood alcohol level is above the legal limit is sub226. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 175.
227. Id. (spotting Justice Frankfurter's famous quote concerning police officers having
the suspects stomach pumped to the point where they induced him to throw up two capsules he had swallowed to show evidence of drugs).
228. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 175.
229. It is the author's opinion that removing DNA by taking blood through a needle is
highly intrusive; especially if someone is phobic of needles and or of seeing blood. Furthermore, taking a cotton swab and placing it in someone's mouth is also a protrusion that may
be beyond embarrassing and private. People generally do not want perfect strangers to
place objects in their mouth without permission. I'm not sure you can do this because of
the Supreme Court's holding in Schmerber that a blood/needle test is a de minimis intrusion. It's almost as if you're overriding a Supreme Court decision.
230. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
231. Id.
232. Rise v.Or., 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (1995).
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stantively related to the crime charged. However, even this is only allowed if probable cause is found. 233 Unlike in Schmerber, the
information obtained from the DNA is not used as evidence in the crime.
According to Schmerber, in order to search for evidence there at least
needs to be probable cause; 23 4 yet with the Act, there is no probable
cause needed to search for the DNA, since the DNA is not being used as
evidence of the crime. Louisiana even concedes this argument through
the text of the Act because Louisiana is willing to give back the DNA if
the arrestee is not convicted. 2 3 5 The Supreme Court held that arrested
individuals may be subject to extremely intrusive searches of their body
cavities and their jail cells for evidence of the crime, but only if they are
"lawfully arrested on probable cause." 236 Louisiana uses the DNA obtained through this Act for non-evidentiary purposes. Thus, at the very
least, Louisiana must maintain a separate probable cause requirement
in order to obtain DNA independent of the arrest.
Taking DNA and placing it in a databank for future identification
23 7
purposes may be useful in identifying a suspect in a future crime.
However, if taking the DNA has no concrete use for the arrestee's current case then probable cause has not been proven to search for the arrestee's DNA. The arrestee is forced to give their DNA for something
that potentially has nothing to do with what they are being charged with
and this is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Probable
cause is needed to arrest an individual, but a subsequent DNA search
used to identify culprits of future crimes requires separate probable
cause. The initial probable cause to arrest does not extend as far as a
DNA search. Probable cause for an arrest cannot be used to search for
future crimes. Probable cause from an arrest does not translate to probable cause to search unless the search involves the substance of the
crime. 238 The purpose of taking DNA under the DNA Act is arguably
intrusive since the reasoning behind the taking of DNA is not
239
substantive.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
La. R.S. 15:614(A)(1)(2)(B)(2004).
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979).

237. La. R.S. 15:602 (2004).
238. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560 (discussing that although the "drawing of blood from free
persons generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a person
has committed a criminal offense, that blood must reveal evidence relevant to that
offense").
239. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 964-965. (discussing Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d
at 1091, where the court found that as long as the DNA was not used for the extraction of
evidence). See also Rise v. Or., 59 F. 3d 1556, 1560 (1995).
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The Potential Disclosure and Mishandling of DNA Information

Moreover, beyond the fact that the DNA information obtained
through this Act is not substantive, the intrusive part of the Act is the
identification purpose in relation to the private information discernable
from the test. The true intrusion comes from the removal of the DNA
information, not necessarily the method of extraction. No matter how
non-invasive the removal procedure is, 2 4 0 the importance of the information contained in the DNA sample is disconcerting. In applying the Kyllo
standard, DNA analysis is not something to which the general public has
access to, 2 4 1 and therefore, a court may find that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Regardless of whether the information is used
solely for identification purposes, the true intrusion is the potential that
an arrestee's DNA sample can later be used to unearth predisposition to
disease, toe length, current illness and other genetic information. The
personal information held within DNA can result in serious non-criminal
ramifications, such as life insurance companies becoming aware of certain diseases and hiking up premiums, or denying life insurance to one's
children, or a person finding out at age sixty they are going to develop
certain illnesses.
Additionally, in analyzing this intrusiveness of the Louisiana DNA
Act, the Kyllo case discussing technological intrusions parallels with this
Act. In the Kyllo case, the Court expressed fear that threat to privacy
"will grow, rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available." 242 This case is ripe for analogy to this
DNA Act because in Kyllo, while there was no privacy intrusion found
within the taking of the thermal imaging picture, meaning no "intimate
details" were revealed, the court still found that the potential of intimate
details being revealed was enough of an intrusion. 24 3 With DNA samples only being taken from arrestees for the purpose of identification, the
likelihood that potentially intimate information could be disclosed is apparent, so much so that the Act creates criminal liability if such disclo240. La. R.S. 15:609 (2004) (describing taking a cotton swab or drawing blood or taking
a hair sample to extract DNA sample).
241. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.
242. Id. at 48.
243. Id. at 39. The court found that "no necessary connection between the sophistication
of the surveillance equipment and the "intimacy" of the details that it observes-which
means that one cannot say (and the police cannot be assured) that use of the relatively
crude equipment at issue here will always be lawful). Id. The Agema Thermovision 210
might disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily
sauna and bath-a detail that many would consider "intimate"; and a much more sophisticated system might detect nothing more intimate than the fact that someone left a closet
light on." Id.
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sure of personal DNA genetic information were revealed. 2 44 What this
insinuates is that the legislature finds the possibility of this occurrence
strong enough to provide a provision that enforces punishment of those
that can disclose sensitive genetic information. 24 5 This demonstrates
that the DNA identification information sought can go beyond identification to the disclosure of sensitive genetic information. For instance, the
genetic information could be given to insurance companies, employers,
investigators, and intrude on the privacy of the donor.
24 6
Moreover, the penalties described in the Act for such disclosure
seems highly disproportionate to the irreparable harm caused by the disclosure of sensitive genetic information or the tampering or mislabeling
24 7
of DNA information. Five hundred dollars and six months in jail
seems slight compared to the government having a monopoly on an arrested person's (with a presumption of innocence) genetic information.
Such information can be highly destructive, not only because medical information may be given to insurance companies, but the fact that the
government can track the person and clone them or perform whatever
conspiracy theories anyone can think of.
Public policy demands keeping genetic information out of the wrong
hands. 2 48 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPPA") seeks to prevent genetic information from being disclosed to
insurance groups. 2 49 However, even in light of HIPPA, there have been
criticisms that "Americans cannot be assured that their DNA will not be
taken or used against their will without their knowledge." 250 In a CNN
244. La. R.S. 15:618 (2004) (discussing criminal penalties for disclosure of DNA information, any person that violates R.S. 15:617(A)(B) or tampers with any of the DNA samples shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned with or without hard
labor for not more than six months, or both).
245. La. R.S. 15:618 (2004) (committee comments).
246. La. R.S. 15:618 (2004) (stating that "any person that violates R.S. 15:617(A)(B) or
tampers with any of the DNA samples shall be fined not more that five hundred dollars or
imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than six months, or both").
247. La. R.S. 15:618 (2004).
248. 45 C.F.R. 164.502 (discussing HIPPA Act - The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) created valuable new protections for millions of Americans - including those with pre-existing medical conditions - who change jobs, become selfemployed or lose their jobs. The Act also protects patient privacy and records security).
249. Hustead, supra n. 41, at 287-289 (HIPPA privacy regulation seeks to prohibit "Protected Health Information" (PHI) from being disclosed, and protected health information is
broadly defined as information past, present, and future physical and mental health or
condition of an individual and also health care, past, present and future of an individual.
And of course this PHI includes genetic information).
250. Id. at 285 (explaining "The United States has no coherent policy for when or how
genetic testing should be encourage, facilitated, discourage, or prohibited. Instead a lack of
uniformity exists and some people in some places have such testing under some
circumstances").
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poll, seventy-five percent of people said that they would not want their
health insurer to have genetic information on them. 2 5 1 Sixty-three percent of people would not take genetic tests if health insurers required
it. 25 2 Eighty-five percent of people believe that employers should be prohibited from obtaining information about their employee's genetic conditions. 253 The "repercussions of having genetic information distilled may
include: loss of insurance, loss of employment, having a mortgage recalled or denied, using genetic information in child custody disputes (pick
the healthier parent over the parent with more predisposed diseases) or
25 4
personal injury lawsuits."
Also, beyond the fact that the Act's DNA indicator will be used only
for the purpose of identification, 2 55 other fears exist. Those fears include
the potential for human error to cause incorrect labeling of samples, or
additional, unnecessary DNA probing done on the sample. No one knows
what really is involved with the DNA samples besides the scientist, technicians, and the government, and DNA samples do contain more information than just the identity of a person. 2 56 Moreover, the unfortunate
reality of human error is disturbing because the arrestee could have his
DNA mistaken with another arrestee who is charged with a more serious
crime. The potential for mistaken identification in a DNA databank is a
risk that may concern the unwilling arrestee whose rights may be en2 57
croached by this unreasonable and intrusive search to get his DNA.
The Fourth Amendment stands to protect the arrestee from such risk of
251. Hustead, supra n. 41, at 287.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 288.
255. La. R.S. 15:611(C) (2004).
256. Hustead, supra n. 41, at 287 (stating that there is "no comprehensive federal law in
place for protecting the privacy of medical or genetic information;" instead there is just a
patchwork of federal and state laws that extend protection to health information based on
the type of entity that collects or creates the information).
257. Kaye, supra n. 38, at 940-941. The author discusses what would happen if a false
match could arise because either the databank sample or the trace evidence sample has
been mischaracterized:
Suppose that in creating the databank, Jones's DNA was switched with Smith's,
and Jones is the true source of the evidence sample. The database search then will
falsely incriminate Smith. But the database search should be the beginning, not
the end of the investigation. Even in the unlikely event that the police have no
other evidence against Smith, a confirmatory DNA test of a new sample taken
from Smith will exclude him as a possible source of the evidence sample. Furthermore, the state has every incentive to keep its database accurate. If mistyping of
databank samples is common, perpetrators of crimes who are represented in the
database will be missed. If samples are frequently mislabeled, subsequent exclusions should cause officials to grow frustrated with the system and to take corrective action.. The resulting feedback makes DNA database searches more reliable
than forensic techniques that typically involve unverified subjective assessments.
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disclosure and error, just as the court found that the Fourth Amendment
prevented the defendant in Lee from having to undergo the risk of sur2 58
gery in Winston v. Lee.
d.

The Arrestee's Status - No Rights to Their DNA

Arguably arrestees are not entitled to a minimal privacy interest after being arrested. This is only true if there is probable cause to do the
search, and yet even without such cause, there is a presumption of innocence. 2 59 In Kincade, the Court found that there was a "constitutional
difference between probation and parole for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment." 260 Regardless of whether a person's status under the law
as a parolee, arrestee, or even a convict, there is some degree of privacy
afforded to the human body in the way of searches. 26 1 Arrestee status
alone does not eradicate one's privacy interest in their body or their bodily fluids. 26 2 The U.S. Supreme Court has claimed that "even a prisoner,
who has no legitimate expectation of privacy in his cell, retains an expectation of privacy in his body unless there is reasonable cause to violate
26 3
his bodily integrity and a legitimate penological interest in doing so."
"Many courts have relied on the assumption that prisoners, because of
their criminal acts, forfeit certain rights and as a consequence retain a
diminished expectation of privacy." 26 4 Given these findings, the Court is
likely to find that arrestee to have a legitimate expectation of privacy of
his or her DNA information.
Furthermore, in light of the recent Kincade decision whereby the
Ninth Circuit found that parolees do have a higher expectation of privacy
than those of convicted inmates, logically arrestees have an even higher
privacy interest concerning searches on and of their bodies (because they
enjoy the presumption of innocence). Based on Kincade, the Supreme
258. Winston, 470 U.S. at 765.
259. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (discussing that 'a detainee simply does
not possess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual").
260. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1095 (citing U.S. v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1991)).
261. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1095 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, the "integrity of an
individual's person is a cherished value of our society," the Kincaid court also discusses the
preeminent zone of constitutionally recognized privacy and that although parole may reduce the degree of constitutional protection afforded an individual's body, it does not eradicate it. Id.
262. Id.
263. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1096 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)). See
Tribble v. Gardner,860 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1988) ('stating that digital rectal searches
of prisoners must be justified by legitimate penological need"). The expectation of privacy
of a parolee, who is released to live at home, in preparation for reintegration into society, is
even greater. See Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that
the constitutional rights of parolees "are even more extensive than those of inmates").
264. Cronan, supra n. 23, at 146-147.
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Court is likely to find that the DNA Act is an unconstitutional search
because it seeks to diminish privacy rights of arrestees an create an intrusive search.
All in all, taking DNA information is highly intrusive... regardless
of the identification purpose. The DNA search analysis is consistent
with the Court's reasoning in Kyllo, where by a search is exceedingly
intrusive because the technology has the capability of presenting intimate secrets within a person's home. 26 5 Likewise, a DNA search is just
as intrusive because it has the capability of presenting intimate secrets
about a person's body. Furthermore, the DNA search may "shock the
conscience" due to the sensitivity of the information obtained and the
intrusion into the body. 266 Arrestees have a justifiable expectation to
have their DNA information be kept private under the Katz reasonable
expectation test. Lastly, because in Kincade, parolees were found to not
have diminished privacy rights so that their DNA may be taken, arrestees should be afforded that adequate right to privacy and against
such an unreasonable search. 2 67 Therefore, without an independent
search warrant and probable cause the mandatory taking of DNA pursuant to the Louisiana DNA Detection of Sexual and Violent Offenders Act
is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

"Where the government mandates a collection of DNA and retains
control over the information contained therein, the provisions for privacy
protection must be scrutinized carefully." 268 DNA is a mystery to many
people and many people are terrified by it. 2 69 Most people would not consent to having their DNA injected into state databanks.
Unquestionably, DNA databanks have proven effective with law enforcement and has made a substantial impact on the criminal justice system. 2 70 However, what is the price but the intimate portrait of one's
genetics. The retention of DNA samples by the government creates an
eerie problem that skeptically asks, "what if the purpose of the DNA is
really for something other than identification... who has control but the
government? The crux of this argument is that these banks may be "un265. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 48.
266. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 175.
267. U.S Const. amend V (conceptualizing the ideology of innocent until proven guilty.
Arrestees are presumed innocent and thus are afforded greater privacy protection).
268. Webster, supra n. 24, at 133.
269. Id.
270. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1113 (discussing recent experience has proven the efficacy of
DNA testing to exonerate the wrongfully convicted, and we do not doubt the importance of
DNA collection for this worthwhile purpose).
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fettered government sponsored bio invasion. "271
The Louisiana DNA Detection of Sexual and Violent Offenders Act
must be administered in a way that fully appreciates the expectations of
an arrestee's privacy. The only way this can be done is through consent
of the people who are giving samples or through a valid search warrant
that requires probable cause. 2 72 The importance of DNA collection to
exonerate the wrongfully convicted is a worthwhile purpose; but, those
who claim wrongful conviction or even wrongful accusation, volunteer
their DNA to prove their innocence. 27 3 However, the proposal here is for
the government to at least make it permissible to take one's DNA (either
by asking the person or asking the court through a warrant) and not
mandatory.
The Act's identification purpose is not going to pass constitutional
muster under the Fourth Amendment. 2 74 First, the governmental purpose does not outweigh the right to one's genetic information. Second,
the special need defense is unascertainable because clearly the Act's purpose is for law enforcement. Third, a real intrusion exists with the potentiality that sensitive DNA information could be exposed beyond the
identification purpose. A fair prediction is that the Louisiana Act will be
struck down. The Court seems reluctant to accept technologies that allow real and potential intrusion into the body of human beings without
permission. Accordingly, the only way the government should get someone's genetic information is simply.. .to ask. The government must ask
the arrestee or ask the court for a warrant... the point is that Louisiana
must ask.
Reneg A. Germainet
271. Kaye, supra n. 38, at 937.
272. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 954 (explaining how DNA databanks do not fit under any of
the exceptions to the probable cause requirements, such as the balancing test or special
needs tests and could be found unconstitutional).
273. Kincaid, 345 F.3d at 1113.
274. Herlica, supra n. 3, at 954 (DNA databanks do not fit under a probable cause exception and could be found unconstitutional. They do not pass the balancing test or special
needs test. Furthermore, States keep expanding to cover more and more individuals which
in turn, makes the banks less justifiable and legitimate).
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